In fact, according to the first chapter of Genesis, animals in the Garden of Eden didn't even kill each other for food before the Fall.
This is because the facts that play the role of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in this theodicy are not contingent facts. Yet, it is not obvious, he claims, that the range of opportunities that human persons in fact have in our world to harm or avoid harming one another is beyond what a good God would allow.
Sometimes, on the other hand, it is to the existence of a certain amount of evil. The answer is that, if either a deontological approach to ethics is correct, or a form of consequentialism that takes the distribution of goods and evils into account, rather than, say, simply the total amount of goods and evils, whether this fact is an impressive reason for questioning the existence of God surely depends on further details about the world.
However, atheologians claim that statement 13 can also be derived from 1 through 3.
If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists. But versions of the argument often differ quite significantly with respect to what the relevant fact is.
While tempting, this way of arguing that incompatibilist Molinism is more plausible than compatibilist Molinism is misleading. The second of these claims avoids the objections that can be directed against the stronger claim that was involved in the argument set out in section 1.
Eleonore Stump offers another response to the problem of evil that brings a range of distinctively Christian theological commitments to bear on the issue.
Other solutions to the problem include John Hick's soul-making theodicy.