The reasoning and justification of the
Explanation vs justification example
Price, A. To sum up, I will leave you with this: Not all reasons are good reasons, and not all reasons justify actions. The following sections examine current debates about psychologism, and other issues, concerning motivating and explanatory reasons. And what determines whether there is such a reason and to whom it applies? Guinevere is not in fact even faintly impressed by such things. Gordon, and B. Bransen and S. Truths of either sort only attain the status of reasons, on Hutcheson's view, when they speak to something in the affections or instincts of those they are reasons for. But the view that mere belief is not sufficient to act for a reason has gained popularity in recent years.
Williams, B. Bakhurst, B.
Justifying reason definition
However, Dancy , — argues that propositions are the wrong sort of thing to be normative reasons, which should instead be identified with states of affairs. According to Smith, normative and evaluative beliefs about what I ought to do or what it would be desirable for me to do, cause me, insofar as I am rational, to have relevant desires that then proceed to play their essential role in motivation. We now turn to when and how reasons explain actions. If, as seems plausible, one acts rationally when one acts for reasons that make it rational for one to so act, then perspectivism must be right: agents who act in error or ignorance often act rationally and, when they do, they act for reasons they have to do what they do. They treat that belief as a reason and are guided by it in acting. It seems undeniable that a person cannot act for the reason that p, or on the grounds that p, unless she stands in some epistemic relation to p: she needs to believe, know, accept, etc. After all, the fact that motivates John, i. For example, the fact that a person has ingested a lethal poison may be a reason for the paramedics to give the person an antidote. Carter, E. Second, even if the same reason sometimes answers the two questions about motivation and explanation, this is not always so. Kolodny, N. First, the current use of the term excludes some otherwise plausible candidates from being motivating reasons. This view is associated with Aristotle who, in the Nicomachean Ethics, links what is right to do what one has reason to do with what is conducive to the good whether intrinsically or instrumentally.
Dancy suggests that the distinction between different types of reason is best understood as one between questions we can ask about them a view that he finds also in Baier : If we do speak in this way, of motivating and normative reasons, this should not be taken to suggest that there are two sorts of reason, the sort that motivate and the sort that are good.
Expressivists seek to understand normative language in terms of the motivating states, desires, intentions etc. Believing as I do that the liquid in the bottle is water I have a subjective reason to drink it but, as it is actually petrol, I have no objective reason.
However, Dancy— argues that propositions are the wrong sort of thing to be normative reasons, which should instead be identified with states of affairs. For Smith, motivating reasons explain our actions.
It seems undeniable that a person cannot act for the reason that p, or on the grounds that p, unless she stands in some epistemic relation to p: she needs to believe, know, accept, etc.
In the normal case my normative reason for fleeing the burning building is that it is on fire—a fact that presents a real danger to me if I stay put—and not that I believe it is on fire—a fact which, by itself, presents no danger to me at all. Expressivists like Gibbard and Blackburn are normative judgement internalists but not normative existence internalists, linking normative judgements analytically as they do to the motivations not of their subjects but of the speakers who give them voice Blackburn , —; Gibbard , — In such a case we surely must retreat to a psychologised explanation if we are to have a credible motivating reason explanation at all. Externalism—as opposed to internalism—has it that claims about obligations or reasons can be taken to represent external facts. It is decidedly unclear, for all Dancy and others say, why we need insist on identity here as opposed to forms of intimacy that fall short of it. Neta, R. For instance, it may be that the sorts of reasons uncovered by these experiments help explain why agents are motivated by the reasons that they avow are their reasons for acting: the prevalence of a right-hand bias in most humans may explain why the item on the right seems more appealing to an agent. Hieronymi, P. There are normative reasons, therefore, corresponding to the variety of values and norms: normative reasons that are moral, prudential, legal, hedonic, etc. At least where a rational agent is acting rationally, her motivating reasons are those considerations which she believes count in favor of her so acting. Some such as Eve Garrard and David McNaughton and Richard Norman would want to insist that being moved to action by such normative and evaluative beliefs, with no independent contribution from desire, should count as motivation. We shall examine below reasons why the temptation should be resisted. In that case, the government is motivated to tax drinks by a reason that there is for it to do so, the reason that may justify its doing so.
A vain person might choose to visit a certain shop because there is a mirror there without it ever consciously occurring to him that this is his reason. Davidson One argument in favour of psychologism for explanatory reasons that rationalise actions depends on the following idea.
Types of reason[ edit ] In philosophy, it's common to distinguish between three kinds of reason. Therefore, any account of normative reasons must offer a plausible explanation of the relationship between the normativity of reasons and the capacity that reasons have to motivate agents to act.
In that case, the government is motivated to tax drinks by a reason that there is for it to do so, the reason that may justify its doing so. Wallace, S. This sort of consideration led to widespread acceptance of the view that explanatory reasons are mental states and, since the latter were not distinguished from motivating reasons, it also led to the view that motivating reasons are mental states.
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